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The 'Similarity' and 'Heterogeneity' Theses in 
Studying Innovation: Evidence from the End-of-Life 
Vehicle Case 
FRANK DEN HOND 
ABSTRACT ?-he paper seeks to understand how ekht companies in the European car industry 
responded to changing business conditions under the threat of regulation on the was& problem of end-of-/@ 
vehicb. It was observed that t h e  companies pursued diverging innovation tracks in dealing with the 
regulatory pressure, although competing in the same markets and subject to similar regulatory pressure. ?he 
case is interesting to consider in the lkht  of recent discussions ofdgerences in s b b  of innovation. Ihe 
question then is whether any sort o f& of innovation may be distinguished in the diverging innovation 
tracks. ?he objective ofthe paper is to add to these discussions by considering the results ofthis case study 
in the light of frirnilarip' and heterogeneig typotheses that may be advanced around frgles' of innovation. 
Introduction: Two Contrasting Theses 
The innovation process is understood as a knowledge-based search for new products, 
processes, organizational routines and organizational structure. Technology development 
is an important means for companies to innovate, but innovation cannot be solely 
understood as technological innovation. Innovation is an important element for compa- 
nies to increase their chances of long-term survival in a highly competitive business 
context. It may also be an important factor for companies to be able to respond to 
stakeholder pressure, for example, in relation to environmental issues. However, the very 
nature of innovation is still not fully understood, despite a vast body of literature. Since 
the first attempts to open up the 'black box' of innovation, it may be argued that at least 
two different streams of analysis have developed. 
In one stream, the innovation process is seen as dependent on various contingencies 
such as market size, size of the firm and characteristics of the technology itself. While 
encompassing various bodies of literature, the central thesis emphasizes the 'similarity' of 
innovation processes among firms that operate under similar conditions. 'Globalization' 
is the strongest example of the similarity thesis. If the markets of an industry converge 
world-wide, if international trade fully liberalizes and if this industry is unrestricted by 
natural resource inputs, then it would be likely that a global style of doing business 
emerges. Examples of industries where the globalization thesis has been proposed include 
the agrochemical and pharmaceutical industries, the microelectronics and information- 
technology industries, as well as (parts of) international finance. The automotive industry 
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is another example for which the globalization thesis has been advanced. According to 
the International Motor Vehicle Program (IMVP), there is one best way of designing, 
assembling and selling motor vehicles, which is described by 'lean production'.' Others 
contest their findings, and argue that it is an empirical question in which several factors 
influence what style emerges.* 
Weaker examples of the similarity thesis posit that distinctive 'styles' of innovation 
may be identified at different levels of analysis, for example within specific geographical, 
industrial or market contexts. National systems of inn~va t ion ,~  industry characteristics: 
and strategic groups5 are examples of theories that match the similarity thesis. For 
example, Pate1 and Pavitt6 find that a firm's industry influences its rate and direction of 
technological accumulation. Pate1 and Pavitt7 find that 'uneven and divergent patterns of 
technological accumulation persist in OECD countries'. Porter8 argues that a firm's 
innovative capability and competitive success in international markets may be enhanced 
by characteristics of its home country. The common thread in these and other studies is 
that the rate and direction of a firm's innovation strategy is characterized by one (or a 
limited number) of variables, firms operating in a similar situation develop similar 
innovation strategies. 
In the other stream, innovation processes are seen as socially constructed, following 
a unique historical path or trajectory in which not only technological or other problems, 
but also the visions, objectives and expectations of innovators and other social actors, 
play a role. Thus, the contrasting thesis stresses the 'heterogeneity', in terms of strategy, 
structure and performance, among firms that operate within the same contexts. T' i~ r m s  are 
unique because of several reasons. First, there is the possibility of 'strategic choice' in 
important contingencies such as (business) environment, technology and firm size.g 
Second, there is scarcity of the critical resources whose adoption and exploitation may 
bring the firm long-term competitive advantage.'' Thirdly, most resources may be used 
to provide a variety of different services." Finally, ordinary people, employees and 
managers may have different preferences, previous experiences and cognitive styles, 
which make them assess and solve differently strategic issues. Heterogeneity has been 
pointed out as a phenomenon that reflects the need ibr companies to distinguish 
themselves from their competitors in order to realize sustained competitive advantage 
and long-term survival.12 Technological innovation at the resource level is seen as an 
important source of heterogeneity. Firms develop new activities as they renew their 
resource base. Rather than the static representations of resources by Penrose and the 
resource-based view theorists (among others Barney and Wernerfelt), a more 'dynamic' 
frame of knowledge and capability building is appropriate to understand and analyze 
tecl~nological innovation at the resource level.13 If different 'styles' of innovation may be 
identified, then they would relate to patterns in the exploitation and exploration of the 
firm's resources. 
The paper seeks to understand how eight companies in the European automotive 
industry responded to regulatory pressure. In the late 1980s, public authorities at the 
national and EU levels questioned the environmental consequences of the amounts of 
waste that remain after the processing of end-of-life vehicles. During the 1990-1 995 
period, car manufacturers developed 'recycling strategies', i.e. coherent sets of actions to 
solve the problem of automotive waste by increasing the recycling rate of end-of-life 
vehicles. 
If the similarity thesis holds, then commonalities within the empirical set of innova- 
tive response strategies can be related to the presence of contingency variables. However, 
if the heterogeneity thesis holds, and if Penrose's view of the firm as a unique bundle of 
related, productive resources is correct,14 then the firm may only solve the issue by 
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changing its activities or products, or developing new activities or products, such that the 
environmental consequences are reduced to acceptable levels. This would require the 
firm to pursue innovation at the resource level, and to change its activities by integrating 
such innovations in their organizational routines. Most likely, this would result in a 
differentiation of responses. 
The End-of-Life Vehicle Recycling Issue 
The environmental issue considered is the need for car manufacturers to reduce the 
amount of waste from processing of end-of-life vehicles. Cars are among the best-recy- 
cled consumer products; about 75% of the vehicle weight (essentially metals) are 
recovered for recycling. However, 25% remains as waste. Today's end-of-life vehicles 
were designed about 15 years ago. Since, the relative share of metals in their material 
composition has decreased, hence the amount of end-of-life vehicle waste is expected to 
increase. Plastic materials have increasingly substituted for metals, and numerous new 
parts that compose of composite materials have been added to the vehicle in order to 
offer novel functions to the customer. 
In the mid-1980s, public authorities in various European countries became con- 
cerned about the increasing amount of end-of-life vehicle waste and started to develop 
policy initiatives aimed at stimulating car manufacturers to reduce this waste stream 
through source reduction and increased levels of recycling. For example, the German 
Environmental Ministry issued a draft regulation in August 1990, in which the Ministry 
proposed that car manufacturers take back free of charge end-of-life vehicles from the 
last owner; that they establish a dense nation-wide network of collection sites for 
end-of-life vehicles; that they re-use parts and materials when economically and techni- 
cally viable; that they disassemble end-of-life vehicles in order to realize precisely-defined 
recycling targets; and that they include waste minimization objectives and the environ- 
mentally compatible treatment of end-of-life vehicles as objectives in the development 
and production of new models. Car manufacturers were allowed to charge a 'third party' 
on their behalf with the responsibility to take back and recycle end-of-life vehicles. Other 
national authorities in the European Union (EU) as well as the European Commission 
followed the German lead, but extensive negotiations between the automotive industry 
and the various regulators influenced the choice of a mode of regulation as well as its 
contents. l 5  
Car manufacturers responded to the threat of regulation by setting up recycling 
schemes, some of them in cooperation with shredder, car dismantling or material 
recycling firms. Politically, they joined forces in national and international lobbies in 
order to prevent the authorities from implementing their policy objectives through direct 
regulation. While accepting the need for solving the end-of-life vehicle waste issue, the 
automotive industry argued it needed full discretion in developing the most effective and 
efficient solutions. Technologically, car manufacturers explored three different search 
trajectories: (1) selective disassembly and recycling of parts and materials, (2) improved 
treatment and separation of shredder waste, and (3) metallurgical recycling. Different 
response strategies are thus observed, different search trajectories were adopted and 
different modes of co-operation were established. With hindsight, three distinctive stages 
can be discerned in the automotive industries efforts to develop recycling strategies 
(Table 1). 
Although end-of-life vehicle waste became an issue only in the late 1980s, the 
automotive industry had already concluded from various studies conducted in the 
1970s-1980s period that changing material composition of vehicles since the mid-1960s 
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Vr
ij
e 
Un
iv
er
si
te
it
, 
Li
br
ar
y]
 A
t:
 1
8:
27
 3
1 
Ma
y 
20
11
5 32 F. den Hond 
Table 1. Four stages in developing recycling strategies 
Time period Most important actors Leading actors 
Stage 0 1970s-1980s Problem definition and identification of 
potential solutions 
late 1980s Research on plastics recyclability 
Stage 1 1990-1991 Start of dismantling pilots and collective 
political lobby 
Stage 2 1991-1992 Build-up of recycling networks via 
bilateral agreements with car 
dismantling companies 
Stage3 1991-1995 Build-up of recycling networks via 
framework agreements with shredder 
companies who act as 'third parties' 
Car manufacturers, individually and via 
industry organizations 
Car manufacturers and plastics producers 
Car manufacturers alone, or with car 
dismantling and shredder companies 
BMW, Ford, Opel 
Volkswagen B Preussag Mcrcedes-Benz B 
Preussag, Renault B Compagnie 
Cranqaise des ferailles (CFF), Peugeot B 
CFF, FIAT B Falck 
might compromise end-of-life vehicle recycling practices in the long run and that vehicle 
disassembly and subsequent materials recycling might contribute to solving the potential 
end-of-life vehicle waste problem. Additional studies were commissioned to propose and 
evaluate potential solutions, including chemical recycling of plastics, vehicle disassembly 
and material recycling, and incineration of shredder waste. In the late 1980s, car 
manufacturers in Germany and France joined plastic producers in large-scale R & D 
projects on plastics recyclability. For car manufacturers, these R & D  projects were 
related to the issue of automotive waste. Knowledge of the recyclability of specific 
materials (physical and chemical properties, costs and benefits) is essential given the 
problem definition and potential solutions. For plastic producers they were parts of larger 
R & D programmes on plastic recycling, since the issue of plastic waste threatened their 
business in other markets as well, notably in packaging. 
It was not until the German Environmental Ministry made public its policy objectives 
that the automotive waste issue became a problem to be solved. A two-fold industry 
response marked the beginning of the first stage. (1) The automotive industry started a 
lobby through its industry organizations in order to prevent government regulation. The 
most important among these were the End-of-Life Vehicle Recycling Project of the 
German car industry (PRAVDA) and the lobby at the European level by the European 
Association of Car Manufacturers (ACEA). In consultation with other industry organiza- 
tions, the industry developed alternative policy plans. (2) Individual car manufacturers 
started so-called 'vehicle dismantling pilots' in 1990-1 99 1. These pilots served multiple 
objectives: 
assessing the cost and potential benefits of vehicle disassembly; 
developing cost-efficient disassembly routines; 
developing and testing concepts for larger scale end-of-life vehicle recycling; 
developing knowledge of design for disassembly and design for recycling; 
increasing the efficiency of current vehicle designs and assembly procedures; 
continuing research into material recyclability; and, 
0 creating markets for recovered automotive materials. 
To a certain extent there was coordination of dismantling activities at the industry level 
through PRAVDA and ACEA. Although car manufacturers reported largely similar 
objectives for their respective dismantling pilots, the greater share of the activities were 
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firm-specific. Several car manufacturers cooperated with companies outside the automo- 
bile industry, e.g. Volkswagen and Peugeot-Citroen with shredder companies and 
Mercedes-Benz with a steel-works. BMW, FIAT, Ford Europe, Opel and Renault did 
not cooperate with other companies in their dismantling pilots. One of the most 
important conclusions drawn from this first stage was that if vehicle disassembly and 
large-scale recycling of automotive parts and materials were to provide a solution for the 
automotive waste problem, this would only be viable in a network of decentralized 
end-of-life vehicle recycling centres. In addition, car manufacturers developed model- 
specific disassembly manuals and design guidelines on how to improve vehicle recyclabil- 
ity, as well as dedicated tools and equipment for draining the end-of-life vehicle and for 
the removal of specific parts and components. The first stage was characterized by the 
acquisition of relevant knowledge and the development of organizational capabilities. 
During the second and third stages, car manufacturers started to implement their 
recycling strategies, building on the results from the previous stage. However, they did 
so in two groups following two different models. BMW, Ford Europe and Opel are in 
the first group. FIAT, Mercedes-Benz, Peugeot-Citroen, Renault and Volkswagen are in 
the second group. For strategic reasons, BMW also joined the second group at a later 
stage. 
Car manufacturers in the first group started to implement end-of-life vehicle recycling 
in the 1991-1992 period. They did so by engaging in bilateral agreements with selected 
car dismantlers. Initially, these cooperations worked on a small scale and ran parallel to 
the dismantling pilots. They served to test under full market conditions the end-of-life 
vehicle recycling concepts as developed in the dismantling pilots. Results were apparently 
positive, since by 1995, BMW, Ford Europe and Opel had associated with several dozens 
of car dismantlers as 'recycling partners' in Germany (and in the case of BMW also in 
other countries) to implement the option of selective disassembly and recycling of parts 
and materials. The car dismantling partners take care of collecting the end-of-life vehicle 
and of administrative procedures for deregistration, and they remove hazardous sub- 
stances from the vehicle. They are not being paid for these activities by the car 
manufacturer, the argument being that car dismantlers can increase their local market 
shares because the manufacturers' commercial network is obliged to deliver end-of-life 
vehicle at their sites. Consequently, disassembly activities for material recycling remain 
limited. For example, BMW requires its recycling partners to disassemble a limited 
number of plastic parts and to deliver these without cost and in separate batches to its 
plastic parts factory. Still, these cooperations are important for another reason. The car 
manufacturer actively assists the car dismantler in modernising its procedures by 
providing expert advice, insists on respecting environmental regulations, and introduces 
new tools and equipment. 
In the third stage, a number of shredder companies and metal refinery firms entered 
the scene. They saw business opportunities in end-of-life vehicle recycling. Such compa- 
nies had developed their own end-of-life vehicle recycling concepts and proposed to act 
as 'third parties' to take commercial responsibility for organising end-of-life vehicle 
recycling. They started to implement the technological option of improved treatment of 
shredder waste. For example, the largest French shredder company, Compagnie 
fran~aise des ferailles (CFE), concluded framework agreements with both Renault and 
Peugeot-Citroen for organizing end-of-life vehicle recycling at an industrial scale, using 
its process for valorizing shredder waste in cement ovens. Since 1992, CFF has opened 
a number of end-of-life vehicle recycling sites in France. At these sites, CFF associates 
with local car dismantlers (via their industry organization) for taking care of vehicle 
drainage. In principle, disassembly of parts for materials recycling could take place at 
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( Selective disassembly 
through a dedicated 
Stages 2-3: 
Implementation of 
recycling strategy ( Improved treatment of 
shredder waste through a 
'third party' 
Stage 1: Developing knowledge and capabilities 
- - --- 
partner partner 
BMW, Ford Europe, 
Figure 1. 'Styles' in developing and implementing a recycling strategy by European 
car manufacturers. 
FIAT, Renault 
CFF's sites, but lack of outlets for recovered materials is the reason why this happens on 
a very small scale. In November 1992, FIAT concluded a framework agreement with 
Falck (a large Italian shredder company), several material recycling firms, and the Italian 
association of car dismantlers. Since 1994, the German con~panies Preussag, Thyssen- 
Sonnenberg and Klockner have proposed comparable framework agreements to the 
German car manufacturers to which Volkswageil and Mercedes-Benz responded. Mer- 
cedes Benz, the only company having explored the option of metallurgical recycling, has 
not (yet) succecdcd in commercializing this concept. BMW also signed such a contract 
as a strategic move to prevent monopoly power, rather than abandoning the previous 
build-up of a dedicated network of car dismantlers. 
Figure 1 summarises the differences among European car manufacturers in the mode 
of cooperation during the knowledge and capabilities building stage (stage 1) and choice 
of technology in the implementation of recycling strategies (stages 2 and 3). The 
discussion of the implementation of recycling solutions indicates that European car 
manufacturers are not eager to take a major control over vehicle dismantling and 
recycling technologies. Rather, FIAT, Peugeot-Citroen, Renault and Volkswagen have 
engaged shredder companies to act as a 'third party' in developing large-scale end-of-life 
vehicle recycling activities. Mercedes-Benz has done likewise, as the company was unable 
to license its metallurgical recycling technology for upscaling and commercialization. 
BMW, Ford Europe and Ope1 have developed dedicated networks of car dismantling 
firms over whose dismantling activities they have close control. It provides them with the 
opportunity of buying recovered material cheaply. 
Mercedes-Benz, 
Peugeot-Citroen, 
Volkswagen 
Discussion I: The End-of-Life Vehicle Case and Similarity Hypotheses 
How may such differences be accounted for? In this section, I forward several hypotheses 
that match the similarity thesis. Table 2 provides the background data for several of the 
hypotheses. I make extensive use of Whiston (1995).16 Whiston is one of the very few 
researchers who advanced hypotheses of why car manufacturers develop diverging 
recycling strategies, without, however, testing them explicitly. His hypotheses come close 
to the various similarity hypotheses of innovation. 
First, industry characteristics are considered. In Pavitt's taxonomy, the automotive 
industry is a 'production intensive' industry, dominated by economies of scale and a 
strong tendency to cost red~ct ion. '~  From this perspective it may well be understood why 
car manufacturers have used the automotive waste issue to improve their vehicle designs 
through the exploration of design for dismantling-or 'design for recyclability'. To  the 
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Vr
ij
e 
Un
iv
er
si
te
it
, 
Li
br
ar
y]
 A
t:
 1
8:
27
 3
1 
Ma
y 
20
11
'Similarip' and 'Heterogeneip' Theses 5 3 5 
Table 2. Summarizing the similarity argumentation 
Market Level of 
Production share vertical 
volume Europe integration Market Country of 
(1) ('4 (3) strategy origin 
Volkswagen 
Opel 
Ford Europe 
Renault 
Peugeot-Citroen 
FIAT 
Mercedes-Benz 
BMW 
All segments 
All segments 
All segments 
All segments 
All segments 
All segments 
Top segment 
Top segment 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany/UK 
France 
France 
Italy 
Germany 
Germany 
Noks: (1) a = <GOO 000; b = < 1 500 000; c = 1 600 000-2 000 000; d = > 2 000 000 data for pro- 
duction in Europe for 1995 provided by CCFA; (2) a = < 6%; b = 6-12%; c = > 12% (data For 1990 
provided by CCFA); (3) a = 20-25'10, b = 30-35%, c = 45-50%, expressed in percentage of value added 
(data for the mid- 1980s, Chanaron, Ref. 19). 
extent that reconsidering vehicle design through a new lens results in cost reduction, 
design innovations have been adopted. This perspective also sheds light on the reluctance 
of car manufacturers to engage in take-back and recycling activities, as they have 
traditionally not been in this business and expected small or negative returns of these 
activities. Take-back and recycling activities would increase the complexity of the 
business, which is at odds with current trends of outsourcing major parts of the 
production process, including the design and supply of parts and components. However, 
the intra-industry diversity in developing recycling strategies is too subtle to be captured 
within Pavitt's taxonomy. 
Cllaracteristics of the intra-industry structure may be advanced as hypotheses 
matching the similarity thesis. Differences in company size and levels of vertical 
integration would clearly be variables to consider. The size argument, when measured 
in units of production volume, can be qualified straightaway. Volkswagen is the leading 
mass producer in Europe, followed by Opel, Peugeot-Citroen and Renault. BMW and 
Mercedes-Benz are relatively small-scale specialty producers. Yet, as may be observed 
from Figure 1, there is no match between size and recycling strategies. 
Regarding levels of vertical integration, Whiston advances that competitive gain 
could be created in the supply of material. Since some car manufacturers retain high 
levels of control and linkage over material and parts supply, the degree of vertical 
integration within a particular auto company is an important factor to be considered.18 
This I~ypothesis is problematic, because it is not sufficiently specified. With respect to 
vertical integration per se it is obvious that there are large differences between individual 
car manufacturers. By the mid-1980s, Fiat, Mercedes-Benz and Volkswagen had high 
levels of vertical integration, whereas those for Renault and Peugeot were considerably 
lower. Opel and Ford of Europe were in between these extremes.Ig However, aggregate 
levels of vertical integration are not constant over time for individual car manufacturers. 
Currently, thcre is a trend to decreasing levels of vertical integration. Because it is 
changing, it would be hard to use this factor as the independent variable in a study. 
Moreover, vertical integration is a composite variable. Levels of vertical integration can 
be decomposed with respect to specific parts and components; design and production of 
some parts and components is fully integrated, whereas other parts are essentially bought 
in, including parts design and technical engineering. They may also vary among the 
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various production plants of individual car manufacturers, because of cost differences. 
Thus, it would not be vertical integration in itself that is a significant variable for 
diverging recycling strategies, but rather the car manufacturers' motivations for choosing 
specific levels of vertical integration, most significantly, in vehicle design and engineering. 
In this case, however, the vertical integration hypothesis reverts to a heterogeneity 
hypothesis. 
Regarding the strategic group hypothesis, Whiston speculates about "the importance 
and influence of the car manufacturer's market-segment or niche, its market share, and 
its particular product image or characteristics on developing a specific recycling strategy: 
"It may well prove to be that the unit-cost of disposal of a single vehicle is fairly 
insensitive to the absolute price of the vehicle. In which case, in relative terms, manufac- 
turers of more expensive luxury vehicles will obtain some comparative advantage. 
Alternatively, from a large mass-production standpoint, new design principles geared to 
improved recycling and disassembly procedures may also possess, in terms of economy 
of scale, some comparative advantage" (emphasis in the ~riginal). '~ This hypothesis 
would require detailed economic analysis, which, according to Whiston, is not feasible for 
the time being, given the "too early" stage of development [of vehicle take back and 
recycling] to carry out or even attempt such an analysis".21 However, this hypothesis may 
also be qualified. According to this hypothesis, BMW and Mercedes-Benz would be 
expected to develop closely similar recycling strategies, but this is shown not to be the 
case. Moreover, the implicit (but incorrect) assumption in this hypothesis is that the car 
manufacturer itself will be undertaking dismantling and recycling activities. At the level 
of the car dismantlcr or end-of-life vehicle recycling plant, the combination of specializa- 
tion into specific models or marks and economies of scale may well lead to a comparative 
advantage. However, the focus of dismantling and recycling (e.g. disassembly of reusable 
parts from total-loss vehicles vs dismantling for material recycling from worn-out 
vehicles) seems to be a prime choice for specialization for car dismantlers and end-of-life 
vehicle recycling plants. The semi-automated disassembly lines, as developed by, e.g. 
Volkswagen, are dedicated to material recovery from worn-out vehicles and flexible for 
the dismantling of end-of-life vehiclcs of different makes. 
Next, the hypothesis may be advanced that car manufacturers' recycling strategies 
depend upon the characteristics of national regulatory pressure, and that they are 
embedded in national industry structures. Indeed, the French and German authorities 
chose different approaches in initiating end-of-life vehicle recycling policies. The Ger- 
mans aimed for direct regulation, whereas the French preferred a voluntary agreement.22 
The Italian and English authorities agreed closely similar agreements to the French, 
whereas the Dutch adopted an approach of their own.23 This might lead to the 
conclusion that national regulatory styles were important variables in determining car 
manufacturers' recycling strategies. However, the German Environmental Ministry was 
unable to keep to its own, preferred mode of regulation. In February 1996, the German 
Ministry agreed to the same voluntary agreement as had been devised in France, because 
of fierce industry opposition to direct regulation. Car manufacturers did not simply 
comply with regulation, but they tried to influence and shape the regulatory context to 
their interests, while simultaneously conserving a considerable space for developing such 
solutions to best serve their interests by collective and organizational learning, and to 
allow for competitive gain to be pursued. The analysis of the French and German cases 
(the two countries that host more than one independently-operating car manufacturer) 
reveals that under the same political circumstances car manufacturers developed diverg- 
ing recycling strategies. Nevertheless, it should be acknowledged that the 'third party' 
contracts with recycling and metal refining companies have a very national orientation. 
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Although the German, French and Italian schemes are oriented toward the same 
technical goals, i.e. improved treatment of shredder waste, there are subtle national 
differences in the composition and operation of the various consortia. 
Finally, little can be said regarding the 'globalization' and 'triad' hypotheses. The 
data used were collected in Europe only. The car manufacturers studied are all European 
companies shown by the facts that their design and development work their production 
and sales are to a very large extent realized in Europe. In this respect also Opel and Ford 
should be considered as European companies, operating quite independently from their 
American parent companies. It was appropriate to limit the case to Europe, as both the 
North American and Japanese companies lag behind the Europeans.24 They watched 
what was happening in Europe and learned from these experiences. 
It would appear from the above that neither of the discussed similarity hypotheses is 
fully capable of capturing the diversity of car manufacturers' recycling strategies. 
Therefore, I wish to turn to the alternative heterogeneity thesis in order to develop 
another explanation, one that is based on resource differentiation between the car 
manufacturing companies. 
Discussion 11: The End-of-Life Vehicle Case and the Heterogeneity Thesis 
Regarding the heterogeneity thesis, Whiston argues that "car manufacturers may 
differentiate themselves in order to gain competitive advantage in end-of-life vehicle 
recycling: those companies who at present are undertaking extensive product develop- 
ment, research, [and] new design, in compliance with any forthcoming disposal-legis- 
lation . . . are pr&erentially priming t lme lues  for new market opportunities" (emphasis in the 
original).25 Indeed, all European car manufacturers have developed some sort of 
recycling strategy, including those car manufacturers (and Japanese importers) not 
studied in this case. He continues to say that "such a statement clearly depends ... upon 
the extent to which any such knowledge gained is tacit or of a transferable-knowledge 
form".26 Two factors indicate that it is fairly difficult for a car manufacturer to gain a 
competitive lead in design for recycling. First, innovatory gain in the automotive industry 
usually lasts for a limited period of time due to a rapid and wide diffusion of knowledge 
and techniques across car manufacturers. Second, within the context of PRAVDA and 
ACEA, car manufacturers exchanged information and discussed a range of potential 
solutions, including design for recycling, thus reinforcing transfer of the relevant knowl- 
edge among them. As a consequence, Whiston suggests that "ultimately there will be little 
'competitive-edge' to be gained", and that currently "it would appear that there is not a 
single pace setter; one manufacturer who is out in front" (emphasis in the ~riginal).~'  
Whiston thus rejects this hypothesis, a hypothesis that points towards the heterogene- 
ity thesis. But he may well have been too quick in dismissing this hypothesis. The 
horizontal collaborative ventures in developing end-of-life vehicle recycling were primar- 
ily aimed at standardizing and optimizing dismantling procedures and at advancing 
knowledge in material recycling. Furthering design-for-recycling knowledge depended on 
dismantling pilots, but these pilots also provided highly valuable feedback on specific 
vehicle designs resulting in cost advantages. Thus, car manufacturers did try to develop 
'innovatory gain' in compliance with any forthcoming regulation. The question then is 
why and how car manufacturers developed diverging recycling strategies in a situation 
of uncertain potential of innovatory gain. 
The argumentation is that companies, in order to solve environmental problems, 
need to change their activities or to develop new activities, i.e. to innovate. Innovation 
theory holds that three factors stimulate companies to innovate: the growth rate and size 
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Table 3. Complementarity, technological opportunity and appropriability determine the 
mode of coordinating the preferred option 
Complementaiity 
Technological 
opportunity 
Appropriability 
of profit 
opportunities 
High 
High 
High 
High 
Low 
law 
Low 
Low 
High 
High 
Low 
Low 
High 
High 
Low 
Low 
High 
Low 
High 
Low 
High 
Low 
High 
IBW 
Resulting mode of coordination 
No cooperation-hierarchical control 
Close co-opcration 
Prepare business plan 
Specialized subcontracting 
No cooperation- diversification 
Distant cooperation 
Standard subcontracting 
No co-operation-'keep the dog out' 
of market demand, technological opportunity and appropriability  condition^.^“ These 
factors have been used in empirical studies of environmental i n n ~ v a t i o n . ~ ~  Given the 
regulatory pressure on car manufacturers to find a solution to the end-of-life vehicle 
waste issue, market factors are not considered to be rclevant in this specific case. 
However, if various innovative options were viable for solving environmental problems, 
it would be expected that firms would prefer to choose that option where tecl~nological 
opportunity is highest and where appropriability conditions are most favourable. 
In addition to innovation theory, theory about the internal growth of the firm is 
relevant too. The Penrosian perspective suggests that firms would prefer to develop new 
activities by expanding the range of productive services that may be derived from the 
resources that they already control, rather than developing activities for which they do 
not yet have the resources.30 If firms do acquire new resources for new activities, they 
would prefer those which are complementary to the existing stock of resources and 
activities, i.e. which enhance their value-adding.3' If various ways of changing activities 
are viable, the firm would prefer the most complementary. 
Moreover, it may not only be argued that firms prefer to choose those options that 
are highly complementary and that have high technological opportunity and favourable 
appropriability conditions, but also that firms prefer to undertake such options them- 
selves, rather than engage in some form of co-operative arrangement or market 
transaction with other companies. Indeed, several authors have proposed that choices 
about the mode of control over activities may be derived from such factors as 
complementarity and appropriability.32 If it is assumed that each option may be scored 
on a dichotomous scale of 'high' vs 'low', and if the factors are independent, then a 
2 x 2 X 2 matrix may be constructed that describes which mode of coordination would 
be preferred (Table 3). 
In situation (a), the option is highly complementary to the firm's core activities; the 
firm sees opportunities for innovation in relation to its resources; and it believes it can 
appropriate the profits from implementing this option. In such a situation, the firm 
should not hesitate to develop this option and to integrate the required resources and 
activities withiel the firm's hierarchy, because in doing so the firm enhances its 
competitive power. Therefore, the firm is likely to pursue a strategy of direct control over 
the implementation of this option and the required resources are developed in-house. 
The extensive programmes for increasing energy and materials efficiency, such as 3M's 
'pollution-prevention-pays' programme would be an example. 
If an option is adequately described by situation (b), the firm does not see profit 
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opportunities or cannot readily appropriate any profits from implementing the option, 
despite high complementarity and high technological opportunity. Close control over 
developing and implementing the option is required, but the firm is unwilling to fully 
integrate these activities since they raise costs without much prospect of positive revenues. 
A strategy of 'close cooperation' would be more apt in this situation. However, the 
combination of high complementarity and low appropriability creates a risk of moral 
hazard; the firm may be 'held up' by its contract partner.33 
When complementarity is high, and when the firm thinks that the opportunity for 
innovation is low but that it will have no difficulties in appropriating profits from 
implementing the option, such as in situation (c), the firm has to choose between 
prevailing technological opportunity or appropriability in its assessment. This situation 
may occur when there is a 'reverse salient',34 or a 'technological imba~ance ' .~~  If the firm 
chooses to explore the few technological options in an attempt to reinforce its core 
capabilities, it faces uncertain and costly investments in R & D, which are likely to be 
integrated within the firm's hierarchy. However, if the perceived lack of technological 
options is considered more important than the appropriability of profits, the firm is likely 
to forego profit opportunities. The decision between these two options depends on a 
detailed analysis of costs and benefits. Thus, the firm should develop a business plan for 
investing in technology development. 
In situation (4 the option is still highly complementary, but the firm does not believe 
that there are opportunities for low-cost innovation in developing the option nor to 
appropriate any profits from implementing this option. Because of high complementarity, 
close control over problem-solving activities is desirable, but the firm might be reluctant 
to invest in developing the required capabilities since it sees few chances for successful 
innovation. A likely strategy in this situation would be to contract another company to 
develop the required highly specialized technology ('specialized subcontracting'). Such a 
solution increases the firm's cost level, but the firm may not be able to escape these 
investments because of the high complementarity. As is the case in situation (b), there is 
a risk of moral hazard. Therefore, before implementing such an option, the firm is likely 
to try minimizing cost by using its power and influence. Generally speaking, end-of-pipe 
pollution-abatement technologies fall into this category. 
Another situation is (e). Any option here is characterized with low levels of comple- 
mentary to the firm's core activities. However, the firm sees options for technology 
development that promise to create appropriable rents. The firm can choose to develop 
the capabilities that are required for undertaking the problem-solving activities, or not. 
If it does, it diversifies in relatively unrelated activities and the firm is likely to try to 
transform these activities in such a way as to make them part of the firm's core activities 
('diversification'). 
However, in a situation of low complementarity, it is likely that the firm lacks the 
required capabilities for developing solutions by diversification. Therefore, diversification 
is a risky strategy, all the more so when appropriability of profit opportunities is uncertain 
or low, as in situation Lf) It is more likely that the firm thinks that other companies can 
implement the option more efficiently, because the required resources and activities 
constitute their core. Then, the firm might engage in cooperative agreements with these 
companies in order to develop dedicated solutions, but because of low complementarity 
there is less need to exert close control over the cooperative agreement. Such a strategy 
could be called 'distant cooperation'. 
If an option were characterized with low complementarity and low technological 
opportunity, yet high appropriability, as in situation e), this would resemble the need to 
buy in standard technology. Because of low complementarity and low technological 
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options, the firm is unlikely to develop such technology itself. However, if other 
companies have developed it, it is profitable for the firm to adopt it, because of the high 
appropriability of profits associated with using the technology. In this situation, the firm 
is likely to follow a strategy of 'standard subcontracting'. The purchasing of standard 
pollution abatement technology would be an example of an option with such character- 
istics. 
Situation (h) is the last possible characterization of an option. In this situation, the 
option is not complementary and the firm does not see low-cost technologicai opportu- 
nities or appropriable profit opportunities. In such a highly constrained situation, 
implementing the option might be a threat to the firm's capabilities, if reallocation of 
scarce resources to problem solving implies a weakening of existing capabilities. More- 
over, the firm is only interested in cooperation with other firms if it can develop low-cost 
solutions for the firm. Therefore, denying the problem, or trying to influence the political 
process in order to redefine the problem or potential solutions, are more likely strategies 
than engaging in developing and implementing the resources and activities for this 
option. This strategy is one of 'keeping the dog out'. 
In order to explain tlle divergence in recycling strategies of European car manufac- 
turers, I proceeded as follows in testing the relationships between complementarity, 
technological opportunity and appropriability. I thoroughly analyzed the three options 
that emerged from the problem definition (selective disassembly of parts and materials, 
improved processing of shredder waste and metallurgical recycling) on the dimensions of 
complementarity, technological opportunity and appropriability. Table 4 summarizes the 
results of this analysis. Next I hypothesized for each option that the corresponding 
organizational arrangement would be chosen for implementation, assuming first that my 
analysis of the options was correct and, secondly, that car manufacturers proceeded in 
the same way. Finally, I compared which were the options of choice and which 
organizational arrangements were adopted in developing and implementing these op- 
tions. It appeared from this comparison that :he hypothesized relationships are confirmed 
by the empirical data (collected through extensive interviewing and document analysis). 
Thus, BMW, Ford Europe and Opel, pursuing the option of selective disassembly of 
parts and materials for recycling, adopted a strategy of close co-operation through a 
dedicated network of car dismantlers when it came to the implementation of this option, 
because profits from such activities would be low and hard to appropriate. The other car 
manufacturers implemented their preferred option of improving the processing of 
shredder waste through a strategy of distant cooperation by concluding framework 
agreements with shredder and metal refining firms as a 'third party'. They did so because 
the level of complementarity and appropriability of profits was considered to be low', 
despite a significant technological opportunity in improving the efficiency of the shred- 
ding process. Moreover, to the extent that car manufacturers identified cost-efficient 
solutions to improve their vehicle designs and assembly procedures during the first stage 
of dismantling pilots, they kept those solutions under their own close control. 
Conclusion 
Based on the similarity and heterogeneity hypotheses, different explanations for the 
variety of innovative responses in the case study are examined. The paper argues that 
neither national, industry-specific, nor market-specific styles of innovation provide 
satisfactory explanations for the observed variety of innovation processes in response to 
stakeholder pressure. The paper aims at making three theoretical points: 
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Table 4. Assessment of the end-of-life vehicle recycling options along the 
complementarity, technological opportunity and appropriability dimensions 
Technological 
Complementarity opportunity Appropriability 
Selective disassembly and recycling 
of parts and materials High High Low 
Improved processing of shredder waste Low High Low 
Metallurgical recycling Low High Low 
(1) Depending on the level of detail in the analysis, different styles of innovation might 
in some cases be distinguished. I propose, however, that sources of variety stem from 
managerial discretion in directing and co-ordinating the innovation process. It is 
proposed that the choice of a specific solution and mode of coordination by 
individual firms depend on the relation between the resources needed for this solution 
and the core competencies of this firm. The relation is described in terms of 
complementarity of resources and activities, perceived technological opportunity, and 
appropriability conditions. 
(2) To the extent that innovation is about the acquisition, development or recombination 
of resources (including tacit, intangible resources such as knowledge, capabilities and 
experience) in order the undertake new activities, I propose that 'complementarity' 
is another innovation stimulating factor in addition to growth and size of the market, 
technological opportunity and appropriability. 
(3) If firms may choose among a variety of organizational arrangements in developing 
and marketing innovations, including internal integration, various modes of inter- 
firm cooperation and outsourcing, I propose that firms' perception's of technological 
opportunities to innovate are an additional factor to complementarity and appropri- 
ability in the mode of governance choice. 
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